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§ 5:10 Potential constitutional limitations
on claims of privilege—The constitutional
right to produce evidence
Sometimes evidentiary privileges collide with a constitutional
right to present evidence. Significant authority holds that this
constitutional right, which most clearly appears in the case of the
accused in criminal cases but may also exist in civil litigation,1
occasionally overrides rules of exclusion, including privilege
rules.2
State constitutions sometimes guarantee a right to present evidence, 3 but this right does not appear expressly in the United
States Constitution. Nonetheless three lines of federal authority
converge to set up such a right. These lines appear in the
constitutional guarantees of compulsory process, confrontation,
and due process. In the Washington case, the Court struck down
a Texas statute making an accomplice incompetent to testify on
behalf of a criminal defendant because it violated the defendant's
right of compulsory process.4 In the Davis case, the Court held
that a state statute protecting the confidentiality of juvenile
proceedings must yield to the defendant's right of confrontation,
thereby allowing the defendant to impeach a prosecution witness
for bias by showing that he was on probation from a juvenile
court adjudication. 5 In the Chambers case, the Court found a
violation of due process where state evidence law barred the
[Section 5:10]
See E. Imwinkelried, The Case for Recognizing a New Constitutional
Entitlement: The Right to Present Favorable Evidence in Civil Cases, 1990
Utah L. Rev. 1, 7–18 (arguing for constitutional right of civil litigants to
introduce evidence, that would normally be excluded under evidentiary rules,
including privileges).
2
E. Imwinkelried, Exculpatory Evidence § 2-2 (1990).
3
See Mass. Const. pt. 1, art. XII; New Hampshire Const. pt. 1, art. 15. In
states lacking an express guarantee, such a right is sometimes found in other
constitutional provisions. See generally Westen, The Compulsory Process
Clause, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 94 (1974).
4
Supreme Court: Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967). See also Rock
1
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v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 52 (1987) (state statute barring testimony by witness
with memory refreshed by hypnosis could not be applied to keep defendant from
testifying) (based on compulsory process clause); Holmes v. South Carolina, 547
U.S. 319 (2006) (defendant had constitutional right to offer evidence that third
party may have been perpetrator of crime for which defendant was charged).
5
Supreme Court: Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 319 (1974). See also Olden
v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 232 (1988) (error to block defendant from crossexamining complainant to show she brought false charge of rape to keep
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defendant from introducing evidence that a third party had
confessed to the murder for which he was being prosecuted and
further prohibited impeaching the third party with his earlier
confession.6
In its 1974 decision in the Nixon case, the Court explicitly
recognized the convergence of these lines of authority to produce
a right to present evidence:
The right to the production of all evidence at a criminal trial
similarly has constitutional dimensions. The Sixth Amendment
explicitly confers upon every defendant in a criminal trial the right
“to be confronted with the witnesses against him” and “to have
compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor.” Moreover,
the Fifth Amendment also guarantees that no person shall be
deprived of liberty without due process of law. It is the manifest
duty of the courts to vindicate those guarantees, and to accomplish
that it is essential that all relevant and admissible evidence be
produced.7

Despite the obvious implications of this broad statement, the
Court has also stated clearly that the constitutional right to present evidence does not necessarily supersede privileges8 or other
evidentiary rules.9 Here is a comment from the Court's 1973 decision in the Rock case:
boyfriend from learning of her relationship with defendant); Smith v. State of
Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 131 (1968) (refusing to let defense show name/address of
prosecution witness violated confrontation rights).
6
Supreme Court: Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). See also
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 41 (1987) (accused has limited due process
right to discover exculpatory evidence in privileged file of government agency
that would affect outcome; files to be submitted for in camera review); Green v.
Georgia, 442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (excluding from sentencing hearing evidence
that would reduce culpability violates due process).
7
Supreme Court: U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 711–713 (1974) (upholding
subpoena by special prosecutor for confidential presidential communications;
claim of executive privilege would not prevail over “demands of due process of
law in the fair administration of criminal justice”).
8
Supreme Court: Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 23 n21 (1967) (not
disapproving testimonial privileges such as those relating to self-incrimination,
lawyer-client, or husband-wife).
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302(1973) (accused must comply
with “rules of procedure and evidence designed to assure both fairness and reliability” in ascertaining of guilt or innocence).
U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709–710 (1974) (privileges “protect weighty
and legitimate competing interests” to constitutional right to offer evidence).
9
Supreme Court: Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145 (1991) (upholding rape
shield statute excluding evidence of consensual sexual relations between
defendant and victim where defendant failed to comply with notice and offer of
proof requirements).
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[T]he right to present relevant testimony is not without limitation.
The right “may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process.” . . . In applying its
evidentiary rules a State must evaluate whether the interests
served by a rule justify the limitation imposed on the defendant's
constitutional right to testify.10

Courts have not settled on a formula to resolve conflicts between privileges and the right of the accused to present evidence,
but commentators favor a balancing approach.11
Such an approach would require courts to assess the importance
and necessity of the evidence in presenting a fair defense and
would include consideration of the defense need to impeach
witnesses.12 To implement this approach, a court would conduct
an in camera inspection of privileged matter13 and then perform
the necessary balancing of the defense need for the evidence
against policies underlying the privilege and the interests
protected by the privilege in the case. 14 If defendant's right to
present evidence were to prevail, the court would decide whether
the appropriate remedy is to compel disclosure or impose a sanction, such as refusing to let a witness testify unless the privilege
Sixth Circuit: But see Bennett v. Scroggy, 793 F.2d 772, 774 (6th Cir.
1986) (refusing to grant overnight continuance to let defense secure essential
witness violated compulsory process clause).
10
Supreme Court: Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987), quoting Chambers
v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973).
11
See, e.g., E. Imwinkelried, Exculpatory Evidence §§ 2–3 (1990).
12
Relevant factors include: (a) reliability of privileged evidence; (b) probative value; (c) centrality of the issue; and (d) availability of other evidence. See
generally Note, Defendant v. Witness: Measuring Confrontation and Compulsory
Process Rights Against Statutory Communications Privileges, 30 Stan. L. Rev.
935, 989 (1978).
13
White, Evidentiary Privileges and the Defendant's Constitutional Right
to Introduce Evidence, 80 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 377, 398 n81 (1989)
(defendant should be able to inspect privileged material in camera upon showing “reasonable basis for believing that the evidence may be sufficiently material”); Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional
Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 Ind. L. Rev. 711, 822 (1976) (solution to “apparent bottleneck” in constitutional analysis would be in camera evaluation by
court).
14
Wisconsin: State v. Pulizzano, 155 Wis. 2d 633, 456 N.W.2d 325, 334
(1990) (defendant established constitutional right to present evidence of victim's
prior sexual assault, but “it remains to be determined whether the State's
interests in prohibiting the evidence nonetheless require that it be excluded”).
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claim is waived or abrogated, striking testimony already given,
or dismissing the case.15
One factor that counts in the weighing process is the source of
the privilege, whether constitutionally derived or resting on statutory or common law. A defendant's constitutional right to present
evidence is unlikely to lead a court to overrule a claim of privilege that is itself constitutionally guaranteed, although the
defense right might be vindicated in some other way.16 Thus it
seems settled that a defendant's right to present evidence would
not lead a court to reject a rightful claim by a witness of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.17 Of course the
problem in this situation might be resolved if the witness is given
immunity in exchange for disclosure.18
Another relevant factor is whether the privilege is held by the
Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional
Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 Ind. L. Rev. 711, 829 (1976) (government can
be required to choose between “dismissing the prosecution, supplying the desired
information, or granting immunity”); White, Evidentiary Privileges and the
Defendant's Constitutional Right to Introduce Evidence, 80 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 377, 393–94 (1989) (if government witness claims privilege, blocking effective defense cross-examination, court should overrule privilege and
require witness to answer or strike testimony and instruct jury to ignore it).
16
Third Circuit: But see U.S. v. Criden, 633 F.2d 346, 356 (3d Cir. 1980)
(reporter's privilege “is deeply rooted in the first amendment,” but can be
overcome by defendant's need for exculpatory evidence).
17
District of Columbia: U.S. v. Thornton, 733 F.2d 121, 125 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(right to compulsory process does not give defendant right to compel witness to
waive privilege against self-incrimination).
Fifth Circuit: U.S. v. Khan, 728 F.2d 676, 678 (5th Cir. 1984) (accused's
right to compulsory process “must give way” to right of witness under Fifth
Amendment not to testify in ways that would tend to incriminate him).
U.S. v. Chagra, 669 F.2d 241, 259–261 (5th Cir. 1982) (neither Constitution nor precedent gives defendant right to override Fifth Amendment privilege
of witness).
18
First Circuit: U.S. v. Pratt, 913 F.2d 982, 991 (1st Cir. 1990) (defendant
is entitled to immunity for prospective witness whose testimony is “essential to
an effective defense” or when prosecutorial misconduct distorts factfinding
process).
Second Circuit: U.S. v. Bahadar, 954 F.2d 821, 826 (2d Cir. 1992) (court
may require government to grant immunity or risk dismissal where: (1) it
engaged in “discriminatory use of immunity” to gain tactical advantage; (2)
testimony is “material, exculpatory, and not cumulative”; and (3) testimony is
“unobtainable from any other source”).
See generally Note, The Due Process Right to Immunization of Defense
Witnesses, 22 B.C. L. Rev. 299, 300 (1981); Note, Witness for the Defense: A
Right to Immunity, 34 Vand. L. Rev. 1665, 1670 (1981); Note, The Sixth Amendment Right to Have Use Immunity Granted to Defense Witnesses, 91 Harv. L.
Rev. 1266 (1978); Note, “The Public Has a Claim to Every Man's Evidence”: The
15
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government or a witness.19 A defendant's constitutional right to
present evidence is more likely to prevail where that privilege is
held by the governmental entity prosecuting the defendant. 20
Courts usually say that the state cannot simultaneously prosecute a defendant and deny his or her access to exculpatory evidence by asserting a privilege. 21 Thus the government cannot
shield the identity of a confidential informant where doing so
would significantly interfere with the ability to present a
defense.22
Although by far the greater number of cases uphold nongovernmental privileges against constitutional attack,23 some decisions
strike the balance in favor of defendant's constitutional right to
present evidence.24 Many privileges have yielded in particular cirDefendant's Constitutional Right to Witness Immunity, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 1211
(1978).
19
Hill, Testimonial Privilege and Fair Trial, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 1173, 1193
(1980) (position of defendant “is markedly different” when governmental as opposed to nongovernmental privilege bars access to evidence; in former case,
“entitlement to relief is clear in principle, and the showing needed to establish
entitlement may be relatively light”; in latter case, “entitlement is itself uncertain”); White, Evidentiary Privileges and the Defendant's Constitutional Right
to Introduce Evidence, 80 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 377, 384 (1989) (in criminal cases, privileges favoring government “should be differentiated from other
privileges because of the concern for maintaining a fair adversarial balance”).
20
Supreme Court: Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57 (1987) (obligation to give defendant exculpatory material applies to evidence within qualified
statutory privilege).
21
Second Circuit: U.S. v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 638 (2d Cir. 1950) (government chose to prosecute, so it was not free to deny defendant “the right to meet
the case made against him by introducing relevant documents, otherwise
privileged”).
22
Supreme Court: Roviaro v. U.S., 353 U.S. 53 (1957). See also proposedbut-rejected Rule 510(c)(2) (qualifying privilege to refuse to disclose identity of
informant who “may be able to give testimony necessary to a fair determination
of the issue of guilt or innocence” in criminal case or of “material issue” on
merits in civil case involving government). See the discussion of the informant's
identity privilege in §§ 5:62 to 5:64, infra.
23
Second Circuit: U.S. v. Turkish, 623 F.2d 769, 773–774 (2d Cir. 1980)
(traditionally Compulsory Process Clause entitles defendant “to bring his witness to court” and adduce nonprivileged testimony, but not “additional right to
displace a proper claim of privilege”).
Tenth Circuit: Valdez v. Winans, 738 F.2d 1087, 1089 (10th Cir. 1984)
(right to compulsory process does not displace “traditional testimonial
privileges”).
24
Fifth Circuit: U.S. v. Brown, 634 F.2d 819, 824 (5th Cir. 1981) (sometimes
privilege or rule of evidence must give way to defendant's Sixth Amendment
rights).
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cumstances, including the marital confidence privilege, 25 the
spousal testimonial privilege, 26 the physician-patient 27 and
psychotherapist-patient privileges,28 the privileges covering mariEleventh Circuit: U.S. v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154, 1167 (11th Cir. 1983)
(privileges must “yield to the paramount right of the defense to cross-examine
effectively the witness in a criminal case”).
See generally Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 Mich. L. Rev.
71, 172 (1974) (“private privileges are unconstitutional as applied” when “additional benefit derived from extending them to exculpatory information” is
insufficient to justify burden on defendant's right to present a defense); Clinton,
The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in
Criminal Trials, 9 Ind. L. Rev. 711, 824 (1976) (court must weigh importance of
governmental or societal interest advanced by privilege against accused's interest in securing “exculpatory privileged evidence”); Natali, Does a Criminal
Defendant Have a Constitutional Right to Compel the Production of Privileged
Testimony Through Use Immunity?, 30 Vill. L. Rev. 1501 (1985).
25
Fifth Circuit: But see U.S. v. Brown, 634 F.2d 819, 829–830 (5th Cir.
1981) (upholding spousal privilege after applying balancing test).
Alaska: Salazar v. State, 559 P.2d 66, 79 (Alaska 1976) (under marital
communications privilege, error to exclude husband's confession to wife that he
committed murder for which defendant was on trial; ruling denied defendant's
“day in court” and “opportunity to present his story”).
California: Rubio v. Superior Court, 202 Cal. App. 3d 1343, 249 Cal.
Rptr. 419 (4th Dist. 1988) (defendant sought videotape protected by marital
communications privilege; court ordered in camera examination to determine
whether defendant's right to offer evidence should prevail over privilege).
Illinois: People v. Foskey, 529 N.E.2d 1158, 1163 (Ill. 1988), aff'd, 554
N.E.2d 192 (1990) (acknowledging state's interest in protecting marital communications, but “defendant's rights to effective cross-examination and due process of law must prevail”).
Some states recognize an exception to the marital confidences privilege
for a communication offered by a spouse accused of a crime, and some say that
only the accused holds the privilege. In such states, the privilege does not block
efforts by defendants to introduce statements that might exonerate them. See
§ 5:40, infra.
26
Oregon: State v. Quintero, 823 P.2d 981 (Or. 1991), decision clarified on
reconsideration, 834 P.2d 496 (Or. 1992) (trial court ordered wife of one
defendant to testify despite claim of spousal testimonial privilege; confrontation
rights of other defendants were superior to her statutory privilege).
27
Minnesota: State v. Hembd, 232 N.W.2d 872, 874 (Minn. 1975) (defendant
entitled to privileged medical records of alleged kidnapping victim that showed
she had previously attempted to commit suicide; defendant claimed that he
detained her only to keep her from killing herself).
Nebraska: State v. Trammell, 435 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Neb. 1989) (defendant
entitled to medical records of victim for cross-examination and impeachment).
Rhode Island: State v. Parillo, 480 A.2d 1349, 1354 (R.I. 1984) (defendant
entitled to medical records needed to impeach key eyewitness).
28
Second Circuit: In re Doe, 964 F.2d 1325, 1329 (2d Cir. 1992) (overriding
psychotherapist-patient privilege in part because of confrontation concerns).
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tal counseling,29 rape counseling,30 and journalists,31 as well as
the protections for deliberations of grand juries32 and trial juries.33
When defendants seek discovery of privileged material during
Eleventh Circuit: U.S. v. Lindstrom, 698 F.2d 1154, 1167 (11th Cir. 1983)
(defendant's right to cross-examine and impeach government witness outweighed claim for privacy of records of psychotherapy).
Connecticut: State v. Pierson, 514 A.2d 724, 733 (Conn. 1986) (allowing
examination of psychiatric personnel with knowledge of privileged records to
determine whether victim had mental abnormality that would affect his
testimony).
Massachusetts: Com. v. Fayerweather, 546 N.E.2d 345, 347 (Mass. 1989)
(trial judge can decide whether accused's confrontation rights should override
privilege protecting victim's psychiatric records).
Michigan: Smith v. Ruberg, 421 N.W.2d 557 (Mich. 1988) (privilege for
private counseling records of victim of sexual offense may be overridden where
defendant shows reasonable probability that records contain information necessary to establish defense).
29
New Jersey: M. v. K., 452 A.2d 704, 709 (N.J.1982) (child's due process
rights to evidence in custody proceeding infringed by statutory privilege for
parental communications with marriage counselor).
30
Connecticut: In re Robert H., 509 A.2d 475 (Conn. 1986) (approving in
camera disclosure of privileged material to see whether it is needed by defense).
Massachusetts: Com. v. Two Juveniles, 491 N.E.2d 234 (Mass. 1986) (if
defendant could show that protected information was likely to be useful to
defense, judge should review communications in camera).
Advisory Opinion to the House of Representatives, 469 A.2d 1161 (R.I.
1983) (absolute privilege for communications between rape victims and
counselors violates rights of confrontation and compulsory process).
See generally Note, The Constitutionality of an Absolute Privilege for
Rape Crisis Counseling: A Criminal Defendant's Sixth Amendment Rights
Versus a Rape Victim's Right to Confidential Therapeutic Counseling, 30 B.C.L.
Rev. 411 (1989).
31
California: Delaney v. Superior Court, 789 P.2d 934 (Cal. 1990) (requiring disclosure of newsman's privileged interview with eyewitness and participant in murder; defense showed reasonable likelihood that information would
be helpful).
New Jersey: Matter of Farber, 394 A.2d 330, 351 (N.J. 1978) (state
constitutional compulsory process clause prevails over state journalist shield
law).
32
Third Circuit: Chesney v. Robinson, 403 F. Supp. 306, 310 (D. Conn.
1975), aff'd, 538 F.2d 308 (2d Cir. 1976) (state privilege for grand jury proceedings yields to defense Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine prosecution
witness).
33
First Circuit: U.S. v. Bailey, 834 F.2d 218, 222–225 (1st Cir. 1987)
(constitutional error to block defendant from talking to jurors).
Fifth Circuit: Durr v. Cook, 589 F.2d 891, 893 (5th Cir. 1979) (defendant
had constitutional right to present evidence of juror misconduct to impeach
verdict despite state statute restricting such testimony).
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pretrial proceedings, however, these privileges often prevail despite constitutional claims.34
Most decisions strike the balance in favor of upholding the
attorney-client privilege, 3 5 perhaps in part because it has
constitutional underpinnings, although what seems even more
important is that this privilege has special importance in litigation and has achieved a kind of primacy.36 Sometimes even this
privilege must yield in the face of constitutional rights of others,37
however, as in the situation where an attorney-client communication exculpates someone charged (apparently by mistake) with a
serious crime committed by the client.38 Elsewhere we argue that
where the client is deceased, the privilege should be subject to a
balancing test in a broader set of cases in which the need for information covered by the privilege is acute.39
Where the constitutional right to present evidence conflicts
with a nonconstitutional privilege held by a private party, the appropriate remedy is uncertain. Some commentators argue that as
California: People v. Hammon, 938 P.2d 986, 992 (Cal. 1997) (in sexual
assault trial, blocking defense effort to get records about complaining witness
covered by psychotherapist privilege; not deciding whether production would be
required at trial).
35
Seventh Circuit: U. S. ex rel. Blackwell v. Franzen, 688 F.2d 496, 501–502
(7th Cir. 1982) (approving balancing test).
Ninth Circuit: Murdoch v. Castro, 609 F.3d 983, 995 (9th Cir. 2010) (in
habeas case, Confrontation Clause jurisprudence did not override attorneyclient privilege to make available to petitioner a letter by prosecution witness to
attorney stating that witness had been coerced to implicate petitioner falsely).
Tenth Circuit: Valdez v. Winans, 738 F.2d 1087, 1090 (10th Cir. 1984)
(approving balancing test).
Eleventh Circuit: Jenkins v. Wainwright, 763 F.2d 1390 (11th Cir. 1985)
(approving balancing test).
36
See § 5:13, infra.
37
California: Vela v. Superior Court, 208 Cal. App. 3d 141, 255 Cal. Rptr.
921 (2d Dist. 1989) (statutory attorney-client privilege must give way when it
deprives defendant of rights of confrontation and cross-examination).
See generally Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 464, 485–486 (1977) (only
clients facing prosecution have absolute right to attorney-client privilege; others
should face balancing analysis in assessment of privilege claim).
38
In such a case, a court would normally immunize the compelled disclosure
of the attorney from use against the client. See Cross on Evidence 399–400 (6th
ed.) (English law may allow attorney disclosure to free innocent defendant). See
generally Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality, 74 Iowa L. Rev. 351, 393 (1989).
39
See the discussion in § 5:31, infra.
34
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a general matter the privilege prevails,40 while others suggest a
remedy of disclosure coupled with a grant of immunity for the
privilege holder.41
Choosing the right course turns in part on whether the
defendant proposes to use privileged evidence for impeachment
purposes or as substantive evidence. In the former case, the
defendant's claim rests on the right of confrontation. The
traditional remedy, if the right of confrontation is frustrated, is
to strike the direct testimony or preclude the witness from testifying,42 but these measures may be unnecessary if the defense has
other ways to test or challenge credibility, and usually it appears
that the right of confrontation can be vindicated without rejecting a proper claim of privilege.43
In the latter case, a defense claim to the use of privileged maWesten, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 Mich. L. Rev. 71, 174–77
(1974) (where defendant can show that privileged information is “indispensable
to rebuttal or to an affirmative defense,” court must dismiss charges); Note,
Defendant v. Witness: Measuring Confrontation and Compulsory Process Rights
Against Statutory Communications Privileges, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 935, 989 (1978)
(whether to compel disclosure depends on how significantly disclosure would
impair social and legal policies underlying privilege).
41
White, Evidentiary Privileges and the Defendant's Constitutional Right
to Introduce Evidence, 80 J.Crim. Law & Crim. 377 (1989) (when privilege unduly favors prosecution, choices include overruling privilege, striking testimony,
or granting mistrial); Natali, Does a Criminal Defendant Have a Constitutional
Right to Compel the Production of Privileged Testimony Through Use
Immunity?, 30 Vill. L. Rev. 1501, 1551 (1985) (privileges arise from “various
privacy concerns” and revelation “should always be required” when due process
and Sixth Amendment so indicate); Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An
Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 Ind. L. Rev. 711,
824–27 (1976) (compelling constitutional argument exists “for affording the accused the ability to pierce claims of testimonial privilege” by compelling court to
grant immunity).
42
Fifth Circuit: Fountain v. U.S., 384 F.2d 624, 628 (5th Cir. 1967) (ultimate
inquiry is whether defendant “has been deprived of his right to test the truth of
the direct testimony,” and if he has, “so much of the direct testimony as cannot
be subjected to sufficient inquiry must be struck”).
Nebraska: State v. Trammell, 435 N.W.2d 197, 201 (Neb. 1989) (if
complaining witness refused to waive privilege for medical records, her
testimony should be stricken).
An intermediate approach would allow defendant to pose the question
but not require an answer. See Hill, Testimonial Privilege and Fair Trial, 80
Colum. L. Rev. 1173, 1174–75 (1980). The jury, aided by argument, may
conclude that privileged information would have been favorable to the defense.
See § 5:12, infra.
43
Fifth Circuit: U.S. v. Brown, 634 F.2d 819, 825 (5th Cir. 1981) (whether
Sixth Amendment rights are violated depends on “alternative means” available
to impeach credibility of witness).
40

terial as substantive evidence rests on notions of compulsory pro- cess
or due process.44 Here the conflict is more intractable. The problem is
solved if the privilege holder is willing to waive the privilege, but
Privileges:
501 choice is between compelling disclosure
§ 5:10and
otherwise
theRule
stark
Rule 501
45
dismissing the case. Where the privilege is held or controlled by the
prosecuting authority, the government can decide whether to waive
the privilege and pursue the case or preserve the privilege and
dismiss the charges.46

